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1. INTRODUCTION TO ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
In 1973 Gerard Debreu reviewed and summarized four major
developments in general equilibrium theory [D.2]. The developments to
which Debreu referred were the relation of the core and competitive
equilibria, existence of equilibria in more general settings (I.e.,
measure theoretic models), computation of competitive equilibria, and
topological properties of competitive equilibria derived by differential
topological methods. Looking now, we would add another major line of
research which differs from the above in that it alters the basic
parameters of the model. Previously the conceptual framework consisted
of a description of an economy in terms of agents characteristics (pref-
erences and endowments and in the case of production, the technological
possibilities)
.
The analysis focused on the correspondence between the economies
so described and their competitive allocations. However it was never
specified how these allocations arose. There was no specification of
how the trades were made. Using the language of Hurwicz [H.2], the analysis
was of the competitive "performance correspondence" without specifying
what the mechanism is which implements this performance correspondence.
ITie first efforts in this attempt to specify how outcomes arose was to
cast the problem in a non-cooperative game theoretic framework. A
mechanism was to be a precise specification of the set of strategies (or
signals) which were available to an agent and the outcome (or allocation)
which would arise from any simultaneous choice of strategies by the agents.
We will call the function relating outcomes to joint strategies a strategic
outcome function.
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As an example, Hurwicz considered the sec of classical pure
exchange economies and let an agent's strategy be the announcement of a
(classical) utility function. The outcome would be (assuming uniqueness)
the competitive allocation. A problem arises, though, in that for many
economies some agents would find that if they announced a utility func-
tion other than their true utility function, the outcome would be preferable
to the one which would have arisen had they revealed correctly. In game
theoretic terms, correct revelation is not a dominant strategy equilibrium;
in Hurwicz 's terms, this mechanism is not incentive compatible. But what
of other mechanisms? Perhaps there is some mechanism which has utility
functions as strategies for the agents and is^ incentive compatible. It
is trivial to design such a mechanism—simply let the outcome be no trade
regardless of the utility functions announced. But here the correspondence
between the economies and the outcomes thus realized (i.e., the performance
function) is undesirable from an economic point of view in that the outcomes
will not in general be efficient.
The question of interest the-n is whether or not, when economically
interesting restrictions are placed on a performance correspondence, there
exists an incentive compatible mechanism which will realize (or implement)
such a performance correspondence. Hurxi'icz [H.2] showed that no Pareto
efficient and individually rational performance function can be implemented
with an incentive compatible mechanism.
This might seem to leave an economic planner in a quandary. If
he designs a strategic outcome function which picks Pareto efficient and
individually rational outcomes when people reveal their preferences
correctly, then in some economies some agents will find it in their own
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best interest to misrepresent their preferences. The outlook is not so
dismal for the planner however. He can ask what the outcome would be
even if agents misrepresented their preferences. The initial concern
was that if agents misrepresented their preferences, this would destroy
any efficiency properties that the planner might have designed, but this
may not necessarily be so. It is at least conceivable that the combination
of agents' strategic behavior leads to "nice" outcomes. If agents are
playing strategically in their announcement of preferences, we are led to
consider as the outcome of the game not dominant strategy equilibria, but
rather Nash equilibria. At the same time the planner might ask why the
strategies of an agent should be announcement of preferences. Why must
the form of the strategies be even related to agents' characteristics?
Possibly by choosing some quite abstract set of available strategies for
agents, the planner might be able to avoid some of the problems Hurwicz
pointed to. So we leave the realn of strategies in which an agent
necessarily has a correct or "truthful" strategy. Instead the agents
are faced with some arbitrary sets of strategies of which they are to
choose whichever they wish, and an outcome will be selected depending
upon these strategies. This has been done for models with public goods.
In Schmeidler [Sc.i] there is an attempt to introduce voting to a model
of an Arrow-Debreu economy with public goods. SchmeidJ er proposed a
mechanism whereby people are taxed proportionately according to the value
of their private goods and tlic tax revenue is used to finance public goods
according to each taxpayer specifications. This individual "earmarking"
is aggregated to determine the quantity of each public good to be produced.
The valuation of the private goods is made at the equilibrium prices. An
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eqiilibrium price and Nash equilibrium of individual decisions as to
how to allocate the taxes is shown to exist. However, the Nash equilibria
of this mechanism are not Pareto efficient.
Groves and Ledyard [GL] suggested a different outcome function.
Thiy considered an economy \vT.th both public and private goods and designed
a -mechanism, i.e., strategy sets for the agents and a strategic outcome
function such that the Nash equilibria are always efficient. One might
tliLnk that the work of Groves and Ledyard solves the planner's problera
of designing a mechanism to implement a desirable performance function.
Thi^re are several problems however. First, they do not allow full
strategic behavior on the part of agents. Rather, they assume that the
agents take as given the prices of both public and private goods (but not
their taxes)
,
While this may be appropriate for addressing the free rider
problem, as they do, it leaves unanswered the question of what will
ha-;)pen v/hen agents take into account their effect on these prices . More
importantly however, there may not exist an equilibrium in their model.
There are in fact large families of economies in which equilibria fail
to exist,
II. SOCIAL CHOICE MODELS
A parallel development has occurred in tlie field of social
chc'ice. In [A.l] Arrow introduced the modern approach to social choice
thoory. In our language he asked w^bether or not there existed performance
correspondences which satisfied a priori desirable characteristics such
as Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-
dictatorship. Whereas in general equilibrium theory the existence of
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"desirable" performance correspondences (e.g., competitive equilibria)
was a cornerstone of the early work. Arrow obtained an impossibility
theorem. Although Arrow was aware of the possibility of strategic
behavior on the part of agents, he specifically avoids consideration
of it. The very structure of the problem, i.e., considering performance
correspondences which are maps from preference profiles into outcomes,
preempts the consideration of agents' behavior. In [Fa] Farquharson
altered the basic framework of social choice to allow stratetic behavior.
He considered a system of sequential majority voting in subsets of the '
alternatives to determine a final outcome. Every voter now takes into
account how his voting interacts with the votes cast by other agents to
determine this final outcome. Farquharson suggested various notions of
stability which would define an equilibrium. In this way he has presented
a model with well-defined strategies sets available to the agents, a
strategic outcome function, and an equilibrium concept.
The next decisive step in the line of research was by Gibbard
[G] and Satterthwaite [Sa] . Gibbard generalized the structure of
Farquharson, removing the restrictions on the specific form of the strategy
sets and allowing arbitrary strategic outcome functions. Within this frame-
work he showed that the only outcome functions which have dominant strategy
equilibria for all profiles of preferences are dictatorial (under an assump-
tion that the minimum number of outcomes is three) . In other words there
are no non-dictatorial mechanisms which have dominant strategy equilibria
for all profiles of preferences. In the social choice framework this
theorem is equivalent to the following: If the strategy sets are taken
to be the set of preferences then there exists no non-dictatorial strategic
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outcose function (with at least three outcoces in the range) for which
the truth is a dominant strategy equiiibritim for all profiles of pref-
erences. Ihe same res'jlt was obtained independently by Satterthwaite.
This result is analogous to the result of Hurwicz on economic mechanisms.
Kurwicz has an assumption of individual rationality (non-coerciveness)
which essentially played the role of non-dictatorship in the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite results.
Cne of the most important conclusions for us arising from the
vork cf Gibbard and Satterthwaite is that within the framework of
strategic outcome functions, the insistence on dominant strategy equilibria
rules cut all reasonable perfortiance functions. Later work by others
(e.g., Pattanaik [Paj and Sengupta [Se] points out that one can weaken
somewhat the concept of dominant strategy equilibria and one still obtains
impossibility results.
Ihese impossibility theorems led Hurwicz and Scbmeidler [HSc]
to the Nasb solution concept for the strategic outcome function. Precisely,
they asked that for any profile of preferences, there exist a Nash equi-
librium and that all Nash equilibria be Pareto efficient. If one is con-
sidering dominant strategy equilibria, Pareto efficiency relative to the
codomaine cf the outcone function is a straightforward consequence. Of
course, whem changing to the solution concept of Nash equilibria one no
longer has Pareto efficiency automatically, hence this restriction was
added as a desirable criterion for the performance function. Non-
dictatorship, or the stronger propertj', synnaetry across people, would
also be a cesirable characteristic. In this framework existence of a
class of mechanisms, i.e., description of strategy sets and stratetic
_"7.
outcome functions, which had these desired characteristics was proved
when there are at least three agents. Masfcin [Ka] independently attained
some of these results and extended others.
III. NASK EQUILIBRIA AND ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
In attempting to apply these results to the other problem of
designing economic mechanisms, one confronts several profaleas. The frame-
work in social choice in general considers only a finite number of outcomes,
whereas the economic problem we are trying to analyze generally has an
infinite number of outcomes, e.g., allocations. wTiile this problem is
not particularly difficult to surmount, there is a more basic difficulty.
In the economic model we have the agents' endowments as a parameter of
the economy in addition to the preferences. One would like to have the
performance function be Individually rational (or non-coercive) with
respect to these endowments. There is no natural way to embed this con-
cept into the social choice framework without destroying the existence
results. Further since the endowments are a parameter of the economic
model, the set of feasible outcomes in this economic model are not inde-
pendent of the agents' characteristics. In the social choice model the
set of feasible alternatives is the same regardless of the agent's charac-
teriistics. Nevertheless these results provide us with valuable insights
into the design of economic mechanisms with desirable features.
Within this framework there are a number of economic models in
addition to those mentioned before which can be analyzed using this con-
cept of economic mechanisms. Unless otherwise mentioned, these models
deal only with pure exchange private goods economies. Shubik [Sh] introduced
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a market clearinj; rule wfiich Shapley and Shubik [SS] used in a general
equilibrium model in strategic outcome function form. In this model one
corainodity is used as raoney . The strategies of agents consist of bids
of :he commodLty money to purchase otlier goods, and offers to sell
quantities of thesfi other goods. Using the market clearing rule Shubik
proposed together with a bankruptcy rule, a Nash equilibrium is shown to
e.xi.>t. Regardless of the agent's strategies the outcome is feasible.
This is accomplished by making the strategies available to an agent depend
on .lis initial endowment. The Nash outcomes in this model are individually
rational. This is guaranteed since an agent has as a strategy the possi-
bility of not participating in the market. IVhile the Nash outcomes are
in general not Pareto efficient, in a modified version of this model [PoS]
it A/as shown by Postlowaite and Schmeidler that the Nash outcome is
asynptotical ly efficient. That is, if there are sufficiently many agents,
none of thera "too large", then tiie percentage of resources of the economy
which is wasted due to the inefficiency is small.
Wilson [W] constructed an example of a mechanism in wliich the strategy
sets are feasible net trades (i.e., tlie strategy sets depend on initial
endowments) fur all but one agent. This central agent has only one strategy
v.;hich Is determined by Ills true preferences. The non-central agents
propose feasible net trades and the central agent accepts the utility
maximal (with respet;t to his preferences) subset of these trades. The
strategic outt;ome function is such that the outcome is feasible for all
choices of strategies and tlie Nash outcome is in the core, a fortiori it
is efficient and individually rational. All the examples considered so
far, considered only strategy sets which did not depend on agents'
-9-
preferences. To the extent that the available strategies differed for
different agents, the dependence was on endowments alone. Tf the preferences
of agents are known or observable by others, we need only a computational
scheme to achieve a particular performance function. We want to deal
with mechanisms which preserve inforroational decentralization with respect
to preferences. That Is we do not allow any dependence of strategy sets
or strategic outcome correspondences on preferences, which we take to be
unobservable. If the central agent in Wilson's example is allowed to
pick as a strategy any strategy appropriate for some preference relation,
the efficiency of the Nasli allocations disappears.
A mechanism discovered by Schmeidler fSc.2) has the strategy
sets the same for all agents and therefore independent of their charac-
teristics, both preferences and endowments. A strategy for an agent
consists of a pair, a price and compatible net trade, that is a net
trade with value at this price. The agents who have announced the
same price trade, and to the extent that their aggregate net trade is
not 0, they are rationed proportionately. Given the strategies chosen
by the other agents, an agent has a strategy which will give him as an
outcome his Walrasian demand for any price announced by other agents. The
Nash outcomes of tliis game (when there are at least three agents) are
precisely the Walrasian allocations. This mechanism thus implements the
competitive performance correspondence when Nash equilibrium is the solu-
tion concept. The price paid for this achievement is nonfeaslbility for
some (non-equilibrium) strategy choices. ITiat is, for some non-equilibrium
strategy profiles, the net trades some agents are to carry out are not
feasible given their initial endowments.
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Hurw:.cz [H.4] also constructed a mechanism with this property
that the Nash outcomes are precisely the Walrasian outcomes and strategy
sets identical for all agents. The strategic outcome function is different
from that used by Schnseidler however. Here an agent trades at the average
price announced by others, and the price he announces affects other agents
only. Kore iiDj)ortantly he also constructed a similar mechanism with
these properties fox economies with public goods. Here the Sash outcomes
coincide with Lindani equilibria. Both examples however have the same
characteristic as Schaeldler's: non-equilibriuE strategies may lead to
non-feasible outcomes.
It is worthwhile to add a coHnient at this point. The non-feasibility
of these mechajiisas is not an oddity which can be rectified by a simple ad
hoc change in ::he inechanlsm, such as asaking a rule which states that no
trade •«ill tak-:i place in the evtnt of non-feasibility. Tnis type of
cnange fundaaientally alters this aechanism and destroys either the
existence or optimality of its Ivash equilibria.
More generally, Hurwlcz, Jlaskln and Postlewaite [BMP] show that
the Walrasian j^erformance function cannot be implemented by a feasible
outcoae function. A proof of this result can be found in Appendix C.
In a general vein Hurwicz iH.5] has explored the relationship
between individually rational and Pareto efficient performance correspondences
implemented by Kash equilibria of strategic outcome functions and the
Walrasian (competitive) perforiiBnce function (Lindahl performance corre-
spondence in the case of public goods). He shovfed that if the Nash equi-
librium correspondence is upper seai-continuous, then for any economy the
ivalrasian allocations must be in the performance correspondence, i.e..
Walrasian allocatiGns tit-^sz be Hash allocations. Hnrwicz also shears that
with scEewhat aore restrictive assiiEptions, aii Kash aliocaEieras 3»st be
Walrasi^r. , ?o get this result Hurvicz assoses that for any strategies
chosen by -:.<^ -. cber agents, the set of oatcoses available to the particula
agent is (assusing free disposal). The upper seErL-coatiauity
required for the first half of the theorisi can be justified ce che grcundi
that S2is.ll jhangc-s ir. the parazieters cf au eccaosy should cause an scui-
lib --- :o cha:age sli^tly. The ccavesity assusptioa used for the oth^r
direction seesE less coJEpeiliug. Thus wiiile Ie geaerai f: oniSES
which have individuail-.- rational, Paretc efficient }Iasb eqiiiiibria ve
exr It Wairasiaa allocations will be Nash. Sash ail; i _
_
:
be Walrasian if the convexity assissptioa falls.
IV. FEASIBILiri- OF ALLDCKTKM MBCHANISMS
We are interested ia the design of an eccnosic 3ec"?^g~i?3r vhicb
yiel-- -=>33ible allocations for any joint set of strategies chosen. This
is of particular impcrrance since as «as seatloaed ia the introduction, i:
is isipossible to design a strategic outcoae fosctioE for which _ :^t
strategy ecuilibria vlli be Parato efficient and i~divicu£lly rational
.
Thus our attention vill be focused on iissh equilibria instead. But here
an agent's optimal strategy viJLl depend upon the strategies chosen by
other agents. Kon-equilibriuE strategy choices vould see— --re- likely,
then, when Nash equiiibrius is our solution concept.
It is quite clear that if feasibility is to be obtained, then
either agents' available strategies or the strategic cutcctie function
ave to depend on agents' endo«aects. If both vere iiidepeEdent cf
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endoxinnents, then for some set of agents' strategy choices which result
in a non-zero net trade for some agent, we could replace, that agent
with another whose initial endowment was so small as to make the net
trade infeasible. Thus the only iiope we have is to introduce dependence
of some sort on initial endoviaents . We i^ill focus on dependence of the
strategy sets on initial endowments maintaining an assumption that the
stratetic outcome function depends on the initial endo\*ments only through
the strategy set dependence. This seems most consistent with tne notion
of decentralization.
We will still ask that the strategy sets do not depend on pref-
erences which we take to be unobservable. In the spirit of decentral-
ization, we will also ask that the strategy set of an agent depend only
on his own endowment, not the endowment of others. Thus we have a mapping
from endowments into an abstract spiice which associates with any initial
endov,Tnent the i>ermissible strategies for any agent with that endowment in
any ecoiiomy.
This dependence of strategy sets f)n this part of the agent's
characteristics is reasonable in that the endox«mients are at least poteiitially
obscrvabJe. An audit of an agent cat) objectively determine whether or not he
has a stated endowment as opposed to the general impossibility of deter-
mining his preferences.
One question which rem.ains however is to what extent an agent's
endowment can be precisely known. A demand to exhibit endowm.ent would
prevent an agent from overstating endowment. But whether or not an agent
can successfully hide or witlihold endouTnent is a more difficult problem.
If agents have complete property rights over their own endowment, a further
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possibility avaiJable to agents is the destruction or elimination of
sorae part o1; this endowment.
If only a ceiling can be put on an agent's endo^inent, another
avenue of strategic behavior is opened for an agent. By "announcing" an
endowEient less than his actual endowment, he changes ttie set of strategies
available to him. This could ultimately leave him in a better position
than if he reported his endowment correctly.
In [Po], Postlewaitc considered mechanisms in which the strategj'
sets were announcements of endowments; preferences were assumed to be knov;n.
it was shown that for any mechanism which yields Pareto efficient, indi-
vidually rational outcomes, correct announcement cannot be a dominant
strategy equilibrium. This is analogous to Hurv/lcz's result with pref-
erences as the strategies.
As we have seen above, we must give up some of the informational
decentralization if we are to design a feasible mechanism whose Nash ecjul-
libria are Pareto-optimai. llurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite [IMP] introduced
such a mechanism whose Nash equilibria are individually rational as well.
More specifically, the Nash equilibria of their mechanism coincides with
the constrained VJalrasian equilibria (see Appendix D) . This last term
means that each consumer maximizes his utility over the budget set con-
strained to feasible bundles. The information that must be known by the
mechanism is vector of endowments.
There is another variant of the mechanism in which the endow-
ments are not known. Here the individuals as part of their strategy state
their endox^mients. It is assumed that it can be verified that they don't
claim to liave more endowment than they actually have, but may state that
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they have less. Again in this variant the mechanism is feasible and
its Nash equilibria coincide with the conwtrained Walrasian equilibria.
A similar informational constraint leads to the feasibility of the
mechanism in [PaS., PoS, SS].
V. INFORl'IATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPUTING NASH EQUILIBRIA
In our introduction we presented the development of the literature
on mechanisms as being necessary to describe how allocations were to arise
through the interactions of agents' actions or choices of strategies. As
we stated, the first efforts in this area utilized the dominant strategy
equilibrium concept. After tlae impossibility results of Hurwicz, attention
was shifted to the concept of Nash equilibrium. It was with this notion
of solution that the positive results of Groves and Ledyard, Hurwicz and
Schmeldler, Sclimeidler, Wilson, Maski.n, and others were derived.
There is an essential difference between the two solution con-
cepts however. If there is a dominant strategy equilibrium, each agent
has a best response independent of the other agents' choices of strategies.
Regardless of what strategies they choose, he can uniformly pick this
strategy. He does not need any Information of what strategies they choos'
to calculate his optimal behavior. Viewed in this light, it is quite
plausible that if tliere is a dominant strategy equilibrium, the agents
in an economy will arrive at it, at least if they know the strategic out-
come function.
The use of Nasli equilibrium presents the £\gents with a much more
complex problem. Nov; an agent trying to choose his "best" strategy finds
that in general this best strategy will change as the other agents change
t.lieir fitrategies. Thus in addition f.o knowing the strategic outcome
function, an agent nay also need to know t!ie strategies of all otlier
agents in order to determine his optimal strategy.
This presents something of a problem. in the previous section
we stated that one very desirable characteristic of a mechanism is that
it be feasible. Regardless of the strategies chosen by agents, we would
like there to be a feasLbJe outcome. But now suppose that the agents in
an economy choose some non-Nash profile of strategies resulting in an
outcome. Will the agents in fact realize that this is a non-equilibrium
position? C J early they wil] if they know tlie messages or strategies of
al]. other agents. lint in some environments, particularly in large
economies, this is an heroic assumption. If an agent is supposed to know
the messages of al! other agents, ho obviously has to be in possession
of "arbitrarily large" amounts of information if we consider economies
with arbitrarily many agents.
This leads to a question of the amount or size of the informa-
tion an agent needs to determine his optimal strategy in response to those
of other agents. Ideally, an agent might see only the outcome to him
from a joint strategy choice and be able to determine whether or not his
choice is in fact optimal and if not, what his optimal strategy is. Fail-
ing this one would hope that at least an aggregate "summary" of other
agents' messages or strategies would suffice. An aggregate summarization
would be a function from the strategy spaces of the otlier agents into a
euclidean space of the same dimension as the individual strategy space.
Examples of summarizations would be summations of the agents' .strategies,
averages of them, etc. Then as the number of agents grows, the "si^je" of
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the Information needed by an agent would not change as v;e consider
larger economies. Is there then a mechanism which yields individually
rational and Pareto efficient Nash outcomes along with an aggregate
summarisation procedure which guarantees agents' will know their optimal
strategy given the aggregate summarization? A somewhat weaker criterion
would be that there is a finite dimensional space which "i^^ould contain
enough information for agents to be capable of knowing their optimal
response, where the dimension of the space is independent of the number
of agents in the economy. The mechanism introduced by Hurwicz [H.4]
whose Nash equilibria coincide with Walraslan equilibria satisfies the
latter weaker condition. The dimension of the space which contains the
summarized information is four times the number of coiuniodities.
As another example we consider the form of the model of Shapley
and Shubik [SS] introduced in jPaS] and analyzed in [PoS] . Here the
strategy sets of the agents are contained in a euclidean space of dimen-
sion 2£ where i is the number of commodities. Given a joint choice of
strategies, an outcome (allocation) arises. From one agent's share of
the allocation, it is not generally possible for an agent to determine
whether or not his strategy is optimal. Suppose though, that he is given
aggregate information in the form of the sum of tiie other agents strategies.
He then knows the combined quantities of the offers to buy and sell all
goods by the other agents. This information Is sufficient for the agent
to calculate his optimal response to the other agents' strategies. We note
that the size (dimension) of this information he needs depends only on the
number of commodities, not on the number of agents. Also note that tlie
strategic outcome function of Hurv/icz, Maskin and Postlewaite [HMP] for
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the case thac the endowments are kaown (appendix I)) also has a summary
function. That is if a perscii knows a vector of dimension four plus
twice the number of coirimodities he is able to compute bis best response
or arbitrarily good responses in the case that there Is no best response
(a situation that ma}' iiappen with this outcome function).
VI. INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OUTCOME FUNCTIONS
The question of informational efficiency deals with the amount
of information which must be transferred within the system. An obvious
aspect of this question, not treated in the previous section, is the
size or dimension of the strategy (or message) space. This question has
been treated by Hurwicz iH,3] and Mount and Reiter [f-IRj. The question
here is what is the ininimal "si'^e" of inforaiation agents must send so as
to be able to effect individually rational and Pareto efficient allocations.
Mount and Reiter present a general -"raiirex^'ork in wlii ch questions of informa-
tional efficiency can be invest igcitcd, Kore specifically, in their frame-
work each agent sends a message in some s];ace M. klien their messages are
consistent (in a well specified sense) an outcome arises from une messages.
They present a system of messages consisting essentially of prices and net
trade allocations wriich results in the competitive performance function,
and show that no other system of messages can use a message space w-hich
is of smaller dimension and still accomplish this. That is, prices and
proposed trades are essentially the most efficient messages which can
effect competitive equilibria. Hurwicz |H.3l with a somewhat less general
framework obtained similar results, though the assumptions could not be
reduced by considering different Pareto efficient Individually rational
performance correspondences than the competitive one.
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Thti resxilts of Moun;: and Reitt^r and iiurwicz tire not. directly
applicable to the ruodel of strategic outc;oine functions. Strategic
behavior on tlie part of agents la not considered in their work on informa-
tion. Rather, they asked what was the smallest message space which would
contain enougVi information to affect "good" allocations i_f agents followed
some prescribed procedure for choosing messages. The fact is that these
messages are in general not donilnnnt strategies if agents consider
"manipulating".
If we turn to strategic outcome functions, the use of prices and
net trades, as messages (strategies) still suffices to generate Pareto
optimal and individually rational Nash equilibria. For instance this is
tlie case in Schmeidler's outcome "unction in [Sc.2]. Ive note that in
[PoSj the mechanism is feasible asymptotically efficient as the number
of agents gets liirge, and has message spaces of dimension twice the number
of commodities. Tiie mechanism Ln [HKP] is feasible, achieves Pareto optimal
and individually rational Nash equilibria and lias strategy spaces of dimen-
sion twice the number of commodities.
-19-
>1ATHEMATT CA). APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: SOCIAL CHOICE
Lot T and A be firixt'3 non-einpty sets and for each t f: T, Let
S. be a non-empty set also. 9, Ik the set of transitive, reflexive and
total binary relations on A. Denote S r^ X .,, S^ . A function f: S •> A
^
- tf: I t —
is calJed a strategic outcome functiori (SOF) . In the case that S = Q
for ail t t: T, i.e., f: .Q -> A, if is called a social choice function
(SCF) . We refer to elements of T as persons, A as alternatives, S. as
strategies, il as oreferences. An element F = (P ) ,,.,£.Q is called a
^ * ^ -- t tin
profile of prefereiices, where an eletne.nc s = (s^) ^o,eS is called a
(strategy) seleetJ.on. Given an SOF f and ?_ l 9. , a selection j?* is
called a dominant strate&v equiJ ibrluin (DF.) if for all heT and all seS,
seS: f (si h.s-'*. )P, r(s) where ('51^,9*. ) = (r\) ^ „, with r^ = s^ for all
—
---
— ii n — — n t t c !. t. t
t 4" "n and r, = s''", . An SOF r is said to be straightforward If it has a' il
DE for every
-^f-U A social choice function is said to be non-raanipulable
if for every peQ
, £ is a DE. An SOF f is said to be dictatorial if there
is an heT (called the dictator) such that for all s, s^'f.S, s, - s-' -=>f (£) = f (s '
)
Theorem (Gibbard-Sat tertiiwalte) : If the image of a straij^htforward SOF f
contains at least three alternatives, then f is dictatorial.
An SCF f is said to be veto y^roof if for all pfifi" and for all
xcA: // {tf-T
i
for al] yeA >il\y] > # T-1 '->f(P) = x. An SCF f is said to
Tbe monotonic if for aJ 1 P' , VfM and kcA if f (P) = x and for all yt.A and
for all tt.T,xPj.y '>xP'y. then f(P') = x. Given an SOF f and PcfJ , a
selection £*t:S is said to be a Nash equilibrium (KE) if for all he'f and
ail scSj^: f(s''OP f(s>-|h,s).
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Theorem (Maskin) : For any veto proof and inonotonic SCF f, there exists
an SOF f such that for all ^eP^ , f(?) = if'(«.)|s is an NE for P}. (In
this case ws say tliat f implemencs f.)
APPENDIX B: ECONOMIC ENVIRONMliNTS
For this appendix we v;il.l modify somewhat the definitions of
1 T
the previous aonendix. Here the sec of alternatives A := ix-(x ) „c(R ) Iz „.x =
— t tei ' te I" t
L
where R is tae Euclidean space whose coordinates are indexed by elements
of the finite non-empty set L (the coinmodity set). In this section we
refer to elements of T also as traders or agents and elements of R as
net trades, where x. is the net trade of agent t. The definition of strategic
outcoTT.e functions, Nasli equilibria, dominant strategy equilibria, and
straightforwardness carry over from the previoas appendix; however, here
we are not interested In all profiles. We are interested primarily in
modelling Arrov7-Debreu pure exchange economies. When an agent compares
two alternatives, he considers only his net trades. Furthermore, this
agent's preferences over his net trades should satisfy the standard assump-
tions of convexity continuity and nsonoConici ty. More formally let us
denote by R the nonnegative orthant of R ' and by R the real numbers and
L
_
.
I
h
agree that inequalities in R hold coordinatewise . Set 9 -. iPe: Q
j
QweR
,
w>0
L
and a continuous, quasi-concave, strictly monotonic tunction u: R -> R
such that for all x>y^^ ' X^'V ii"^ [y+w^R or u(x+w)>u(y+w) when x+w and
y+wcR ]}. The analogue of a social choice function (correspondence) of
Tthe previous appendix is a prescription correspondence g:Q_ -^A where ^ - '^
Two prescription correspondences which are coiixmonly used are the Walraslan
correspondence (WE) and PETR correspondence (Pareto efficient and individually
rational). Given Pce^, ^^'(P) = U=(Xj.) ^^^'''^jao^^iJcR^ such that for all ttX,
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XeR :px,.-pv and pxjlpw "'^X^Pj.^) where w is from the definition of Q
above. Given ?eO, PEIRCP) -^ {x=(x/>. .-.-• eA \ for all teT x P^V.^i'^
{x = (X ) r, t.A j for all y t.A: [for nil tciT >" ? x^ i "'> [for all tcT
Y^P^Y^]}. Given an SOF f:S ->^ A its biash performance correspondence
t t t —
NEf is the correspondence from to A that assigns to each P^ in 0^ the
set NEf (P) H {f(s^)£;A
| £ is an NR for ? (and f)> in A.
Given an SOF f and a ? in 0^ a selection s* in S^ is said to
be a strong equilibrLum, SE, (for f and ?) if for any subset C of T
and any selection s in S : ([for all t in C, f (_r) r^f(s^*)] ^^for all
t in C, f (£")P^.f (O ] , v/here r = s for t :in C and r -• s*, for t in
TsC)
.
Theorem : (Schmeidler) 1. If #T>2 then there is an SOF f such that
WE(-)=NEf(-) on e_. 2. If in>2 then there is an SOF f such that for
]P in 6^ induced by a differentiable and strictly quasi-concave (utility)
function: WE(P) = NE,(P) = {seS | s is a H'iL lor ? and f}.
Theorem (llurwicz) : Let an SOF f be given sucli c'tiat on 6^, NEf (• )c:PKIR( •)
and NEf(-) is upper semicontinuous. Then on 6, VJK(- )cNEf ( ) •
If S = S for ail L an T and an SOF f:S -^ A is symmetric across
persons in T then it is said to be Lotally (Informationally) decentralized.
This is Che case for the SOFs of this appendix. However in order to get
feasibility one has to give up some of the informational decentralization.
Indeed the domain of the SOF of the last appendix includes information on
the initial endowments.
L T
Fcrmaily we have a function f:S X(R ) -> A and a partition
I I
of 9 to sets (0 iwe(R,' ) > so that P = (? ) ^c iff for all t in T, P,
-w'— -H- — t' trX t
-22-
Is induced by w . All previous definitions apply under the convention
that wherever PeO we use the SOF f restricted to S X{w}
.
APPENDIX C: IMPOSSIBILITY OF A WAI.RASTAK AND FEASIBLE MECHANISM
Proposition: No mechanism which has a strategic outcome func-
tion which is independent of preferences and yields feasible outcomes
for all strategy profiles can have Nash equilibrluin allocations coincident
with Walrasian allocations for ail economies.
Proof: Suppose there is a mechanism which has a strategic
outcome function independent of preferences and for all economies has
equivalence of the set of Nash equilibrium allocations and Walrasian
allocations. We will construct two econoTnies, each with three agents
and two commodities, showing that general feasibility is impossible.
In the first economy, e, agents 1 and 2 have the same utility function
U (x,y) = U (x,y) = y - e ' and identical endowments w = w = (1,3).
Agent 3 has utility function U (x,y) = xy and endowment (2,6). It is
straightforvjard to show that price P = (1,1) is competitive resulting
1 2 3in the Walrasian allocation x" = x = (0,4) and x = (4,4). By assump-
tion this must be a Nash allocation, i.e., there exists a message triple
(m^ ,ia ,m ) which is a Nash equilibrium ivhich results in the Walrasian
allocation above.
The second economy, e., will bo identical to the original in
all respects except for the utility function of the third agent. We
-3 1+elet U (x,y) = x y. The marginal rate of substitution for agent 3 at
the point (4,4) is now l+r, which is different from the price ratio.
Hence the Walrasian allocation for the original economy e is not VJalrasian
in e. Since we assujned that the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is
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equivalent to the set of Walrasian allocations (m. ,in.-,Tn ) is not a Nash
equilibrium in e. It is clear that If either agent J. had a message rn*
such that (m*,m„,m^) resulted in an outcome which was strictly preferred
to (0,4), tills v;ould contradict the fact that (in-,mp,in-j) is a Nasli equi-
librium in e, and similarly for agent 2. Thus if (m, ,m^,;n^) is not a
Nash equilibriu!n in e, agent 3 must have a message m* with the outconie
resulting from (in ,in„,in*) yielding strictly higher utility than (4,4)
.1. '~ ^
according to the utility function U . In Figure 1 the indifference
curves for both U" and U tlirough the point (^,4) are shoi-m and repre-
sented II and II respectively. It is straightforward to verify that iT
lies above 11 to the left of the vertical line through (4,^^) and below it
to the right.
The outcome to agent 3 Crom the message triple (m ,in^,ni'^) must
lie above II. If this ontcome vjere on or to the left of the vertical
line through (4,4) it would be above II as well as II, Since this contra-
dicts the fact that (in, ,m.-,,in ) is a Nash equilibrium in e, tlie outcotie to
5 must lie to the right of the vertical line through (4,4). But this means
he must receive niore than 4 units of good x, while the total quantity is
only 4. Thus if (m jm.jjro^) is not a Nash equilibrium in e, there must be
non-feasible outcomes for some strategy profiles.
There are three agents in this example l)ecause the examples of
Hurwicz and Schmeidler which have equivalence of Walrasian allocations
and Nash allocations work for economies in which there are at least three
agents. It is straightforward to modify the example so as to provide the
same effect with either two agents or more than three. The specific
utility functions for agent three are not critical; the only requirement
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is that to the left of the vertical line the nev; indifference curve should
not be below the original Indif ference curve and that the previously
Wairasian allocation not be Walrasian with the new indifference curve.
The essential feature is that the Wairasian equilibrium give all of
one commodity to this agent. Any preferences for the otiier agents
wliich permit a Wairasian equilibrium with this feature could have been
incorporated instead of those used.
(0,8)
\
\^
(4,4)
— I
- - I
\
(4,0)
Figure 1
(8,0)
APPENDIX D: FEASIBLE KECMNISM GUARANTEEING CONSTRAINED WALRAS EQUILIBRIA
T is the finite set of agents #T > 2
L = 1, ..., I Is the set of c:oTniriodlties
p = ft dimensional price simp] ex
i. it
S = ((p,x) E PxR
I
O < X, p-x = p-w.
}
The outcome function is defined as follovjs:
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1. If a i,j,kf;T such that p., p., p are distinct
MX.il
), =
•- y VI-
li JY M
-"I i A,. I I
1.
where w = X w
2. If ii only two prices p and p' announced and at least two people
announce each p and p*
\ = w, V^
3. If a p such that p = p for all 1: (3.1) and 7. .x j" w then h^ = w
(3.2) and '>' ^,x = w then h = x Vt
tf.j t t t
^. If there exist p and m .y.t. p i p, p = p for all t f m then
h = (p'w /p-x )x
(4.1;
!i =^ [(l/#T-i.)j(2-h ) t f m if h < wt m- ' in """
(4.2) h = w if ^-(h < w)
Definition: An allocation (y. ) f-T and a price p are a constrained
t t. " "*"
Walrasian equilibrit iin if
i) Vt, p'y = p'w,.
t I..
ii) Vt, y, > y V y < w such that p*y < p'w,
t - 1 — — c
Theorem: (Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlev;aite) : The set of Nash equilibrluiD
allocations (N.E.) for h coincides x^ith the set of constrained Walrasian
eqailibrlura allocations (C.W.E.).
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